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]// INTRODUCTION 
Most developed countries have a system, which protects workers against the financial risk 
of unemployment. This paper describes the unemployment insurance systems in four 
countries: the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany. In these four 
countries, the unemployment insurance system consists of 'regular' unemployment 
insurance and unemployment_assistance. Under unemployment insurance, the eligibility for 
payments usually depends on the contributions, made to the scheme in a previous period. 
The level of benefits is often related to the previous wage rate and the duration of benefit 
payment is limited. Unemployment assistance complements unemployment insurance and 
is meant for those unemployed who are not entitled to regular benefits and who are 
unable to support themselves. We use the phrase 'unemployment insurance system' for 
both regular unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance in this paper. 
Section 2 discusses the general principles of social security and unemployment 
insurance and briefly examines some alternatives to social security, like private insurance 
and a basic income system. In Section 3, on the unemployment insurance system in the 
Netherlands, we first describe Dutch social security in detail and give a brief history of 
Dutch unemployment insurance. Next, we study the current unemployment insurance 
system in the Netherlands, giving special attention to four characteristics of unemployment 
insurance: eligibility requirements, the level of unemployment benefits, the maximum 
duration of benefit entitlement and the financing method. 
Section 4 reviews the unemployment insurance systems in Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and Germany. These countries were chosen as an object of study for various 
reasons. Sweden is just like the Netherlands a small open economy, with comparable 
benefit levels but much smaller unemployment than the Netherlands. Swedish 'active 
labour market policies' are often considered to be an example for the Dutch. The United 
Kingdom was chosen because the British unemployment problem resembles the Dutch 
situation, and in both countries unemployment insurance is sometimes blamed for the high 
unemployment. Unemployment insurance in Germany is studied, because the economie 
situation in this neighbouring country is very important for the Netherlands: large 
differences between the unemployment insurance systems in both countries do not seem to 
be possible nor probable in the long run. 
Section 5 examines rwo important aspects of unemployment insurance in the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany. Firstly, the coverage of the 
unemployment insurance systems, i.e., the fraction of the unemployed that receives 
payments under unemployment insurance or assistance, is studied. Secondly, the replace-
ment ratio, i.e., the ratio of benefits to wages, is examined. These two properties of the 
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unemployment insurance system are crucial for the protection that the system offers 
against the financial risk of unemployment. This section also briefly discusses the outlays 
on unemployment insurance in the four countries. In the final section of this paper, we 
shortly summarize our main findings and draw some conclusions on the 'generosity' of the 
unemployment insurance systems in the four countries. 
2 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND SOCIAL SECURTTY 
2.1 SOCIAL SECURTTY: INSURANCE AND ASSISTANCE 
Unemployment insurance forms a part of the sociai security system. Veldkamp (1984, p. 
16) defines sociai security as: "all institutions and provisions that are directed at the 
securing of a certain Standard of living". This broad defïnition of sociai security includes 
cash transfer programmes like sociai insurance, sociai assistance and housing benefits, but 
also the minimum wage, government's full-employment policies e tc . However, this paper 
uses the term sociai security in the more narrow sense of the already mentioned cash 
transfer programmes. Most important among these programmes are sociai insurance and 
sociai assistance. 
Sociai insurance typically consists of two parts: insurance against the employees' 
risk of losing income as a consequence of sickness, disability or unemployment and 
insurance against more 'general risks' sucb as old age, the costs of medical treatment and 
the costs of raising children. 
Sociai assistance usually guarantees a minimum income to people who cannot 
provide for their own means of living. It differs in an important way from sociai insurance: 
eligibility for sociai assistance often depends on current income and wealth (it is 'means-
tested'). Another difference is the fmancing of the benefits: while sociai insurance is 
financed by contributions of employers and employees in most countries, sociai assistance 
is financed out of general revenue. 
Among the cash transfer programmes of sociai security, sociai insurance for 
employees against the risks of disability, unemployment or sickness is closest to private 
insurance. The 'equivalence principle' (sometimes cal led the 'insurance principle') -
msurance premiums depend on risk and the leve! of the benefit depends on the premium-
i- often used in employees' sociai insurance. The first statutory sociai insurance pro-
grammes against employees' risks can be found in New Zealand, against accidents in 1882, 
and Germany, against sickness in 1883 and accidents in 1884 (see Veldkamp, 1978, p. 59). 
These and the other sociai insurance programmes of the nineteenth century, were directed 
at the professional risk of employees. The benefits were financed by contributions, which 
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were related to the worker's wage, as was the level of the benefit. The name of Bismarck 
is connected to this kind of social insurance system. One also speaks of the ' Continental 
system' as opposed to the 'British' or 'Beveridge' system, after Lord William Beveridge 
who was the designer of the British social security system after the second world-war. In 
the United Kingdom, there is no relation between social insurance and being an employee. 
The most important distinction between the British and the Continental system is the 
absence of a connection between wage and benefit in the fonner: the British system 
typically pays flat-rate benefits. In contrast with the continental system (in which the 
insurance principle is used), the Beveridge system stresses the 'solidarityprinciple'. 
Nowadays, social insurance against 'general risks', such as old age, the costs of 
raising children and the costs of medical treatment is usually organized along the Bever-
idge line, while employees' risks are often covered by a continental system. Hence, most 
countries have a mixed system of social insurance. 
The origin of social assistance can be found in the poor laws and charity of the 
past. Unlike social insurance, social assistance has nothing to do with the 'equivalence 
principle': all people are guaranteed a minimum Standard of living and benefits are 
financed out of general revenue. As previously mentioned, the receipt of social assistance 
is usually subject to a means-test. 
2.2 ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS 
Private insurance is often seen as an altemative for social security, especially for employe-
es' social insurance. The case for private insurance as opposed to social insurance is made 
on the grounds of greater efficiency, lower administrative costs and the securing of the 
diversity of choice. However, Atkinson (1989, pp. 112-118) and Vijlbrief (1992) show that 
the case for the privatisation of social insurance is not as strong as is sometimes suggested. 
There are important reasons like redistribution, insurance market failures, paternalism and 
even administrative efficiency for state intervention in social insurance. 
Negative income tax and a basic income system are other alternatives for the 
current social security system. Negative income tax can replace the current, quite complex 
systems of social security and taxation. The social security system and the tax system are to 
be integrated into one, in which benefits are received when income lies below a certain 
level and tax is paid when income rises above that ievel (see for an example of a negative 
income tax system, Douben, 1988, p. 331). The important parameters of such a system are 
the 'guaranteed minimum income level' (the income level at which benefit receipt changes 
in paying tax) and the accompanying tax rate. High levels of both may lead to a reduction 
in the effective supply of labour. On the other hand, if the minimum income is set to a low 
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level, social assistance will still be necessary for people who are not able to provide for 
their own means of living. 
In a basic income system, the guaranteed minimum income is called a 'basic 
income'. Characteristic for the basic income approach is that benefits are no longer linked 
to a person's work status: it would no longer be necessary to determine the employment 
status of the recipiënt. This would mean a saving in the administrative costs of social 
security. Moreover, the basic income approach offers the opportunity to abolish the 
minimum wage, because the income of people in low-paying jobs would be supplemented 
by the basic income. 
As with negative income tax, the important choice is the level of the basic 
income. The granting of a full basic income at the 'social minimum' - to provide for the 
necessary means of living - to every adult person, would be costly (see Pierik, 1989, for an 
example for the Netherlands). These high costs are primarily caused by the eligibility for 
benefits of new groups of people, like dependent partners e tc , under a basic income 
scheme. However, this 'individualisation' of benefit entitlement could also be regarded as 
an advantage of a basic income, for example from the point of view of women's emancipa-
tion. 
Next to the full basic income approach, there are proponents of a partial basic 
income scheme, in which every adult would be entitled to a basic income, but this basic 
income would be lower than the 'social minimum' (see Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid, 1985). A partial basic income would still offer the opportunity to reduce 
the minimum wage and hence to increase employment, against a lower cost than the full 
basic income. However, as a partial basic income can not fülly replace the current social 
security system, it will probably lead to an even more complex system of social security. 
2.3 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
The phrase 'unemployment insurance' is somewhat misleading: in many countries the 
protection against the financial risk of unemployment involves social assistance too (see 
Table 1, for the situation in 1987). However, traditionally, the provision of income for 
unemployed workers was a part of social insurance, rather than social assistance. Orig-
inated as a mutual insurance by employees, it developed into an important part of the 
social security system in most countries (Section 3.2 studies the history of the Dutch 
unemployment insurance system in more detail). 
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Table 1 : Institutional structure of unemployment benefit schemes applied in the OECD 
countries (1987) 
Insurance-type 
scheme 
Assistance-type 
scheme 
Dual system 
Australia X 
Austria X 
Belgium X 
Canada X 
Denmark X 
Finland X 
France X 
Germany X 
Greece X 
Iceland X 
Ireland X 
Italy X 
Japan X 
Luxembourg X 
Netherlands X 
New Zealand X 
Norway X 
Portugal X 
Spain X 
Sweden X 
Switzerland X 
Turkey 
United Kingdom X 
United States X 
Source : OECD, 1988, p. 116. 
The already mentioned equivalence principle is present in most current unem-
ployment insurance systems. Eligibility for benefits depends upon the period of employ-
ment (in which contributions were paid), the duration of the benefit entitlement is also 
related to the previous employment period and the level of benefits is proportional to the 
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pre-unemployment wage (up to a certain maximum). 
Unemployment benefits are usually financed by contributions of employers and 
workers. The level of these contributions is related to the wage of the worker (again up to 
a certain maximum). In most countries, the level of contributions does not vary according 
to the unemployment risk, with the United States as an important excepjion. In this 
country, the employer has to pay contributions on the basis of his unemployment history. 
This financing system of unemployment insurance is called 'experience rated' (see Vijlbrief, 
1992, for more details on this financing system). 
As Table 1 shows, social assistance also provides protection against the financial 
risk of unemployment. These assistance schemes are based on the solidarity principle: tfaey 
usually pay a flat-rate benefit, financed out of general revenue. In most cases the duration 
of the benefit entitlement is unlimited and the unemployed are subject to a means-test to 
become eligible for unemployment assistance. 
3 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
3.1 THE BACKGROUND: THE DUTCH SOCIAL SECURITYSYSTEM 
The Dutch social security system distinguishes social insurance and social assistance. Social 
insurance includes employees' insurance and national insurance. Employees' insurance 
consists of provisions against the loss of income as a result of sickness ('Ziektewet'), 
disability ('Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering') and unemployment ('Werkloos-
heidswet'). Characteristic for employees' insurance is the relation between earnings and 
benefits. Table 2 shows the eligibility conditions, the level, the maximum duration and the 
financing of sickness and disability benefits (unemployment benefits are studied in Section 
3.3)1. Health insurance -insurance against the costs of medical treatment- ('Ziekenfonds-
wet'), is also part of employees' insurance. It is obligatory for employees who earn less 
than Dfl. 50,900 in 1990. The Dutch govemment is working on the transformation of 
employees* health insurance into a national insurance against the costs of medical 
treatment. 
National insurance in the Netherlands consists of provisions in case of old age 
('Algemene Ouderdomswet'), for the disabled ('Algemene Arbeidsongeschiktheidswet') 
In the summer ofH>9JL,the Dutch govemment announced reforms in sickness and 
disability insurance. These reforms include incentives for employers and employees to 
reducëTEé nümber of claims for sickness benefits and a proposai to make the duration of 
disability benefits dependent on age (see Chapter 7 for the background of these reforms). 
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and for widows and orphans ('Algemene Weduwen- en Wezenwet') . National insurance 
also includes child benefits ('Algemene Kinderbijslagwet') and insurance against the risk of 
exceptional health costs, which are not covered by health insurance ('Algemene Wet 
Bijzondere Ziektekosten'). 
Table 2 : Sickness and disability benefits in 1990 
Sickness Disability 
Eligibility all employees all employees who are (parti-
ally.but for at least 15%) dis-
abled, for more than one year 
Level 70 % of daily wage (up to a 
maximum of Dfl. 266), always 
the guaranteed minimum 
income 
for persons who are disabled 
for 80 % or more, 70 % of 
daily wage (up to a maximum 
of Dfl. 266), always the 
guaranteed minimum income 
Duration 52 weeks after a waiting period 
of 2 days 
indefinite until the age of 65 
Financing contributions by employers (5.90 
%) and employees (1.20 %)*** 
of gross wage, up to a maximum 
daily wage of Dfl. 266 
contributions by employees 
(12.15 %) of gross wage, above 
a threshold of Dfl. 92, up to a 
maximum daily wage of Dfl. 
266 
In most industries, sickness benefits are above 70% of daily wage. When 70% of 
the daily wage is less than the guaranteed minimum income, it is supplemented 
(see text). 
People who are 'less-disabled' receive a smaller disability benefit. 
This is an average for industries. 
The levels of benefits for senior citizens, for widows and orphans and for the 
disabled are all related to the net minimum wage. In general, couples get a benefit of 100 
percent of the net minimum wage, while single people are entitled to 90 percent of the net 
minimum wage when they have dependent children and to 70 percent in the absence of 
dependent children3. The relation between flat-rate benefits and the net minimum wage is 
known as the 'net-net link' ('netto-netto koppeling'). Beside the net-net link, the Standard 
of living of benefit recipients is also legally protected by the indexation of the rise of the 
Since the end of 1988, widows and orphans insurance also applies to widowers. The 
Dutch government intends to reform widows and orphans insurance in 1992, making the 
benefit means-tested. 
3
 National insurance disability benefits amount to a maximum of 70 percent of the 
minimum wage for a fully disabled person. When this benefit is lower than the guaranteed 
minimum income (the 'social minimum'), one is entitled to supplementary benefits. 
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minimum wage to the average rise of contract wages in the private sector4. Child benefits 
are flat-rate benefïts, dependent on the number and the age of the children. The level of 
child benefïts is linked to the cost-of-living index. Insurance against exceptional health costs 
covers, for example, the admission in a psychiatrical hospital, nursing-home e tc . 
National insurance benefits are financed out of contributions of employees and 
self-employed, with the exception of child benefïts which are paid out of general revenue. 
The national insurance contributions are levied, together with income tax, on gross annual 
income above Dfl. 4,568 up to a maximum income of Dfl. 42,123 (in 1990). The contribu-
tions rates for 1990 are: old age insurance 14.30 %, disability insurance 1.15 %, widows 
and orphans insurance 1.25 % and for insurance against exceptional health costs 5.40 %. 
Hence, characteristic for national insurance in the Netherlands is the financing by 
employees^ contributions (proportionai to income, up to a certain maximum) and the pay-
ment of flat-rate benefïts. This part of Dutch social insurance is based on the principle of 
solidarity. 
Table 3 : Public and unemployment assistance 
Family situation Benefit level 
married couple (or two persons living 
together) 
100 % of the net minimum wage (1990: 
Dfl. l,588.57monthly) 
single parent family 90 % of the net minimum wage (1990: 
Dfl. l,429.71monthly) 
single person (older than 23) 70 % of the net minimum wage (1990: 
Dfl. l,112.00monthly) 
single person (sharing the house with 
other persons) 
60 % of the net minimum wage (1990: 
Dfl. 944.04monthly) 
The Dutch government intends to reduce the benefit for schoolleavers between 
21 and 27, to the level of study grants (1990 : Dfl. 783,= for people, not living 
with their parents). 
/ Social assistance is the second part of the social security system in the Nether-
lands. It includes public assistance ('Algemene Bijstandswet'),! unemployment assistance 
('Rijksgroepsregeling Werkloze Werknemers'), supplementary benefits ('Toeslagenwet'), 
the social employment service ('Wet Sociale Werkvoorziening'), assistance to senior and 
partially disabled unemployed employees ('Wet Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en Gedeelt-
4
 The act in which this indexation is settled, was hardly applied in the eighties because 
of financial problems of the Dutch govemment. The coalition of social and christian 
democrats decided to restore the indexation in 1990 (see for further^.details, Vijlbrief and 
Van De Wijngaert, 1992). 
elijk Arbeidsongeschikte Werkloze Werknemers', IOAW) and assistance to senior and 
partially disabled former self-employed ('Wet Inkomensvoorziening Oudere en Gedeeltelijk 
Arbeidsongeschikte Gewezen Zelfstandigen', IOAZ). 
Public and unemployment assistance are meant for all Dutch people who are not 
able to provide for their own means of living. Public and unemployment assistance are 
directed at those people, who are not eligible for any other social security provision: it is 
'assistance of last resort' or a 'safety net', as it is sometimes called (see De Jong et al., 
1990, p.5). People on public or unemployment assistance are obliged to seek a 'suitable 
job' (we return to this point in Section 3.3). They are paid flat-rate benefits, which are 
based on the net minimum wage. The level of the benefit depends on the family situation; 
this level is called the 'social minimum'. Table 3 shows the level of assistance benefits for 
different groups of people. Public and unemployment assistance are means-tested on the 
family level. The income-test applies to the recipiënt of the benefit and to his or her 
partner: the receipt of other benefits (for example unemployment benefits) or income from 
capital leads to a one-for-one reduction of assistance; 25 percent of the income from 
labour (up to a certain maximum) is not subtracted from assistance for a period of two 
years. Next to the income-test, recipients of assistance are also subject to a wealth-test: 
when (family-) wealth exceeds a certain maximum, one is not entitled to assistance (for 
owners of a house, the wealth-test is less restrictive). Public and unemployment assistance 
are financed out of general revenue. 
Supplementary benefits are meant for people on sickness, disability or unem-
ployment benefits, whose income lies._b.elow-the-guaranteed- imnimum-Tneome (social 
minimum). The social employment service provides jobs for people who are physically or 
mentally handicapped or who are, for some other reason, unable to work in a normal job. 
Working in a job of the social employment service is voluntary. The social employment 
service is administered by local authorities. Finally, assistance for senior and partially 
disabled unemployed employees and assistance for senior and partially disabled former 
self-employed are discussed in Section 3.3 on unemployment insurance. 
The organisation of social security in the Netherlands is shown in Table 4. 
Employees' benefits, (national) disability benefits and supplementary benefits are adminis-
tered by 23 industriaTassociations, managed by employers and employees. The contribution 
rates for unemployment and disability insurance are determined by the Minister of Social 
Affaire and Employment. Proposals for these contribution rates are made by the unem-
ployment fund ('Algemeen Werkloqsheidsfonds') and by the disability funds ('Algemene 
Arbeidsongeschiktheidsfonds' and the 'Arbeidsongeschiktheidsfonds'). These funds are 
managed by employers, employees and representatives of the government. 
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Table 4 : The organisation of social security in the Netherlands 
Arrangement Administra-
tion 
Supervision 
SOCIAL 
INSURANCE 
Employees' 
Insurance 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Industrial 
Associations 
Social 
Security 
Council 
Sickness 
Insurance 
Disability 
Insurance 
Health 
Insurance Health 
Insurance 
Funds 
Health 
Insurance 
Council 
National 
Insurance 
Exceptional 
Health Costs 
Insurance 
Child Benefits 
Social 
Security 
Institute 
Social 
Security 
Council 
Old Age 
Pensions 
Widows and 
Orphans 
Insurance 
Disability 
Insurance 
Industrial 
Associations 
Social 
Security 
Council 
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 
Public/Unem-
ployment Assist-
ance 
Local 
Authorities 
Minister of 
Social Affairs 
and Employ-
ment 
Social Employ-
ment Service 
IOAW/IOAZ 
Supplementary 
Benefits 
Industrial 
Associations 
Social Security 
Council 
The contribution rate for sickness insurance is determined by the industrial associations 
themselves. Supervision on the correct administration of the above mentioned benefits is 
exercised by the Social Security Council ('Sociale Verzekeringsraad'), composed of 
representatives of employers, employees and the government. 
Old age pensions, benefits for widows and orphans and child benefits are 
administered by the Social Security Institute ('Sociale Verzekeringsbank') and the Labour 
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Boards . The Social Security Institute also advises the Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment on the contribution rates for old age pensions and widows and orphans 
insurance. Health insurance and insurance against exceptional health costs are adminis-
tered by the health insurance funds ('Ziekenfondsen'). These funds also advise the 
Minister of Social Affairs and Employment and the Minister of Welfare, Public Health and 
Culture on the contribution rates for both insurances. Supervision on the health insurance 
funds is exercised by the Health Insurance Board ('Ziekenfondsraad'), in which employers 
and employees are represented. Finally. social assistance (except supplementary benefits) is 
administered by local authorities under the supervision of the Minister of Social Affairs 
.and Employment. ~" "" -—-~ — " ~ """- —-
 0 , t 
JT V 
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3.2 THE HISTORY OF DUTCH UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE r ^ jS* J$' 
fik r X 
Unemployment insurance in the Netherlands originated in the second half of the mne^j ,/-" 
teenth century with the mutual unemployment insurance of trade union members. ^v 
Members of trade unions had to pay contributions to an unemployment fund ('werk- Qrx 
lozenkas') to finance benefits for unemployed members. Local authorities subsidized these 
funds, which was adopted by the central govemment during the first world-war ('Nood-
regeling Treub', 1914 and 'Wachtgeldbesluit', 1917). Beside the subsidization of the 
unemployment funds, local authorities had started their own unemployment assistance, 
mainly because the coverage of the unemployment funds was very small. In the 1930s, the 
influence of the central govemment on local unemployment assistance increased, as the 
govemment. paid the greater part of it. After the first world-war, employers had started to 
make arrangements for payments to employees on temporary layoff, the 'unemployment 
pay arrangements' ('wachtgeldregelingen'). These arrangements were also subsidized by 
the central govemment. 
The unemployment pay arrangements, as well as the local unemployment assist-
ance still existed after the second world-war, while the unemployment funds had disap-
peared. Post-war social security in the Netherlands was influenced by the report of the 
'Van Rhijn-committee', that was written during the war in London. According to this 
report, the Dutch social security system, which was mainly organised along the Bismarck 
line, had to be (partially) reformed in the direction of the Beveridge system. Social insu-
rance, more or less based on the equivalence principle, had to be complemented by social 
security, which was meant for all people, not just employees. 
These Labour Boards were independent regional institutions until april 1988, when 
the Labour Boards became agencies of the Social Security Institute. 
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In the Netherlands, statutory unemployment insurance for all employees in the 
private sector was introduced with the Unemployment Insurance Act ('Werkloosheidswet') 
of^l949,|Which came i n t o _ e J ^ t _ i n _ 1 9 ^ According tothïs~licïr^BütcTF^ 
insurance consisted of two parts: the unemployment pay arrangements and the actual 
unemployment insurance. Unemployment pay was meant for employees who were closely 
related to a cerfiörindustry (in the sense of work record). Contributions for unemploy-
ment pay were paid in full by the employers and employees of the industry. The maximum 
duration of unemployment pay was forty days. Unemployment insurance benefits were paid 
to employees who were not eligible (anymore) for unemployment pay. Unemployment 
benefits were financed by employers, employees and the central government. The maxim-
um duration of unemployment benefit entitlement was 130 days (of which forty days of 
unemployment pay for the eligible employees). The level of unemployment pay and unem-
ployment benefits was related to the pre-unemployment wage of the recipiënt (up to a 
certain maximum): until 1985 this was 80 percent of the pre-unemployment wage, 
afterwards 70 percent. 
Local Unemployment assistance continued to exist until ,1965, when it was 
replaced by two arrangements: the Unemployment Provision Act ('Wet Werkloosheids-
voorziening') and the Unemployment Arrangement ('Rijksgroepsregeling Werkloze Werk-
nemers'). The Unemployment Provision Act was introduced to prevent unemployed 
workers from entering public assistance too quickly. Originally, the maximum duration of 
unemployment provision was two years. In the eighties, the maximum duration was 
differentiated according to age and work record. The level of unemployment provision 
benefits was related to the pre-unemployment wage of the recipiënt (up to a maximum). In 
1986, the benefit was 70 percent of the pre-unemployment wage. 
The Unemployment Arrangement is a part of public assistance ('Algemene 
Bijstandswet'), introduced in 1965 (see Section 3.1). As unemployment assistance continued 
to exist unchanged after the major reform of unemployment insurance in the Netherlands / 
in 1987, we willgiveno further attention to this subject here. 
3.3 THE CURRENT UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM 
In 1987, unemployment insurance in the Netherlands was drastically refonned, with the 
introduction of the New Unemployment Insurance Act. 'Normal' unemployment benefits 
and unemployment provision were integrated and the maximum duration of unemployment 
benefïts became dependent on the work record of the unemployed person. Next to unem-
ployment insurance, the risk of losing income as a consequence of unemployment is 
covered by unemployment assistance, supplementary benefits and the assistance to senior 
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and partially disabled unemployed employees and former self-employed. In this section, as 
in the next section on unemployment insurance in Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
Germany, we look at four charactenstics of the unemployment insurance system: eligibility 
conditions for benefits, the level of unemployment benefits, the maximum duration of 
benefit entitlement and the financing method of the system. Table 5 gives a summary of 
these four properties of the Dutch unemployment insurance system. 
Table 5 : The Dutch unemployment insurance system 
Eligibility employees who lose at least five hours of 
work or half their working time and who 
worked for at least 26 weeks in the year 
preceding unemployment 
Level of benefit 70 % of daily wage up to a maximum of 
Dfl. 266 (1990) or 70% of the minimum 
wage (follow-up benefits); always the 
guaranteed minimum income; unemploy-
ment benefits are taxed 
Maximum duration 6 months base period, supplied with 6 to 
54 months of extended benefit, duration 
depends on work record; another year of 
follow-up benefit of which the level is 
70% of the minimum wage 
Financing employees' (1990: 0.51 % + 0.65 %) and 
employers' (0.51 % +1 .45 %) contribu-
tions of gross wages , up to a maximum 
daily wage of Dfl. 266 
the contribution rates consist of unemployment pay contributions (0.51 %, an 
average of industries) and unemployment insurance contributions (0.65 % and 
1.45%) 
Only private sector employees are eligible for unemployment insurance. Civil 
servants have their own protection against the loss of income as a consequence of 
unemployment. However, theDütcïT~government intends to integrate the unemployment 
insurance systems of employees and civil servants. To be (fully) eligible for unemployment 
benefits, an unemployed worker has to meet the following additional requirements (next to 
those mentioned in Table 5): 
he or she has to be involuntarily unemployed; 
he or she has to register at the employment office; 
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he or she has to apply for and accept a 'suitable' job6; 
he or she has to cooperate in educational programmes. 
If one does not comply with these eligibility conditions, benefits can be (partially) refused, 
either temporarily or even permanently. Moreover, the administration of unemployment 
insurance (the industrial associations) can reduce the maximum duration of benefits as a 
penalty. 
The level of the unemployment benefit is, as shown in Table 5, related to the 
pre-unemployment daily wage, up to a maximum daily wage. However, if unemployment 
benefit falls short of the social minimum, income is supplemented. When dealing with 
social assistance to the unemployed (of which supplementary benefits are a part), we 
return to this issue. Follow-up benefits are flat-rate benefits at the level of 70 percent of 
the minimum wage. 
After a base period of six months of benefit entitlement, the maximum duration 
of unemployment benefits depends on the work record7. To be entitled to extended 
unemployment benefit, one has to meet the 'three-out-of-five requirement': in the five 
years before unemployment, the unemployed person must have had a job for at least three 
years. Periods in which one had to take care of young children during the five years 
preceding unemployment, are (partially) counted as periods of employment. This also 
applies to periods in which there was full entitlement to disability or sickness benefits. 
Employees who are entitled to a (partial) disability benefit, immediately preceding or on 
their first unemployment day, do not have to meet the three-out-of-five requirement. The 
maximum duration of extended benefits depends on the work record of the unemployed 
person, which is calculated as the employment period of the last five years (the 'actual' 
work record) plus the 'fictive'work record (age minus 23 years). Table 6 shows how the 
maximum duration of extended benefits is related to this calculated work record. After the 
exhaustion of extended unemployment benefit (or if one satisfïes the three-out-of-five 
requirement, but the work record is insufficiënt for extended benefits), an unemployed 
person is entitled to one year of follow-up benefit. When an unemployed worker is at least 
57'/6 years old at his or her first unemployment day, entitlement for follow-up benefits may 
continue until 65. 
The definition of a suitable job is "a job that is in agreement with the abilities of the 
unemployed person, unless accepting the job is impossible because of physical, mental or 
social impediments" (Riphagen, 1989, p. 140). 
In fact, the base period of six months still consists of eight weeks of unemployment 
pay and eighteen weeks of unemployment insurance benefit. However, this distinction is 
only administrative. 
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Table 6 : The duration of extended unemployment benefits 
Work record Maximum duration of benefits 
5 years of more 3 months 
10 years or more 6 months 
15 years of more 1 year 
20 years of more 1.5year 
25 years of more 2 years 
30 years or more 2.5 years 
35 years of more 3.5 years 
40 years or more 4.5 years 
Unemployment benefïts are financed by employees' and employers' contribu-
tions, levied on gross wages up to a maximum daily wage of Dfl. 266 (in 1990). As shown 
in Table 5, the contribution rate for unemployment pay is 0.51 percent for workers and 
employers in 1990. This contribution rate is determined by Üie industrial associations. The 
contribution rates for unemployment insurance are determined by the Minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment (after a proposal by the unemployment fund). In 1990, the 
contribution rate for employees is 0.65 percent and for employers 1.45 percent. 
In the Netherlands, social assistance for unemployed people includes supple-
mentary benefïts, unemployment assistance and the special arrangements for senior and 
partially disabled unemployed employees and former self-employed. Persons who receive 
unemployment benefits, but whose income is below the social minimum, are entitled to 
Q 
supplementary benefits, which supplements their income to the social minimum . 
Earlier (in Section 3.1), we discussed unemployment assistance as a part of 
public assistance. Here, we only study some details of unemployment assistance. People, 
between 18 and 65 years old, are eligible for unemployment assistance, if they are willing 
to work for at least half the normal working time. As mentioned in Section 3.1, unem-
ployment assistance is income- and wealth-tested. The level of benefits for different groups 
of people, is shown in Table 3. Schoolleavers under the age of 21 are not entitled to 
unemployment assistance, but are offered a job or schooling instead. After six months of 
unemployment, the Dutch govemment also guarantees a job or education to schoolleavers 
between 21 and 26, and to unemployed youngsters (under 21). The Dutch govemment nas 
also started special programmes for long-term unemployed, such as a restart programme 
('heroriënteringsgesprekken') and 'job-pools' for persons who do not have much chance on 
The same applies to people on sickness or disability benefits. 
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the regular labour market (see Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1991, 
pp. 45-62, for a review of Dutch active labour market policies). 
Assistance to senior and partially disabled unemployed employees is meant for 
unemployed employees who were older than fifty at the beginning of their unemployment 
spell and who have exhausted their benefit entitlement, and for partially disabled 
employees, who are not (or no longer) entitled to unemployment benefïts. The level of 
benefits is equal to public and unemployment assistance (see Table 3). People on 
assistance to senior and partially disabled unemployed employees are obliged to seek a 
suitable job (except those people who are older than 57'/£). Most important difference 
between this special arrangement and public or unemployment assistance is the absence of 
a wealth-test under this arrangement. However, recipients of benefïts under assistance to 
older and partially disabled unemployed employees are still subject to an income-test at 
the family level. Assistance to senior and partially disabled former self-employed is a 
similar arrangement for former self-employed. 
4 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN SWEDEN, THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMANY 
4.1 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN SWEDEN 
The Swedish unemployment insurance system consists of regular unemployment insurance 
and unemployment assistance. 
Unemployment insurance is closely tied to trade unions: although membership of 
an unemployment insurance rund is, in principle, voluntary, it is compulsory for trade 
union members. Table 7 reviews four characteristics -eligibility requirements, the level of 
benefit, the maximum duration and the financing method- of Swedish unemployment 
insurance. 
Next to the requirements, mentioned in Table 7, a worker has to meet other 
demands to be eligible for unemployment insurance. He or she must have worked for at 
least 17 hours per week, must be involuntarily unemployed, has to register as a job seeker 
at the employment office and a suitable job has to be accepted. Educational programmes 
and temporary jobs, offered by the Labour Market Board, are sometimes regarded as a 
suitable job. When a worker refuses to accept a suitable job, benefits can be denied for a 
certain period. Until 1989, there was a five days waiting period to become eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefits in Sweden. 
The unemployment insurance funds choose from a range of permissible benefit 
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levels, proposed by the Swedish government. According to Björklund and Holmlund (1989, 
p. 166), the funds typically choose the maximum permissible benefit level. Unemployment 
benefits are taxed since 1974. 
Table 7 : Unemployment insurance in Sweden 
Eligibility worker must have paid contributions for 
at least one year to unemployment insur-
ance fund; he or she must have worked 
for five out of the twelve months preced-
ing unemployment 
Level of benefit flat-rate payments of ± 80% of the aver-
age wage of the sector in question; no 
more than 90 % of the previous wage; 
benefits are taxed 
Maximum duration under the age of 55: 60 weeks; over the 
age of 55: 90 weeks 
Financing ± 9 0 % of the expenses is financed by 
govemment subsidies 
In 1974, the maximum duration of benefit entitlement was extended to the levels 
mentioned in Table 7. Before 1974, workers under 55 were entitled to only 30 weeks of 
unemployment benefit and the maximum duration of 90 weeks only applied to unemployed 
over the age of 60. 
Originally, Swedish unemployment insurance was mainly financed by the 
members of the unemployment insurance fund, but the govemment's share of expenses has 
increased substantially. In the eighties, approximately 90 percent of the expenses are 
covered by the government. Since 1989, government subsidies cover 100 percent of 
unemployment insurance benefits, while members' premiums are used to finance adminis-
trative costs. The government subsidies are partly financed by a special payroll tax that 
covers 65 percent of these subsidies, while the remainder is financed by general revenue. 
Unemployment assistance ('Kontant Arbetsmarknadsstöd') was introduced in 
1974. As it is the case in the Netherlands, Swedish unemployment assistance is meant for 
unemployed persons who are not eligible for unemployment benefits (especially new 
entrants on the labour market). Either a work or a schooling requirement must be 
fulfilled: five months of work within the last twelve months, twelve months of full time 
studies above the compulsory level, or five months in labour market training. Schoolleavers 
face a waiting period of three months, before they become entitled to unemployment 
assistance. Since 1985, the minimum age to qualify for unemployment assistance benefits is 
20. Under that age, unemployment assistance is replaced by a job or schooling guarantee. 
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Swedish unemployment assistance pays flat-rate benefits, which are subject to 
taxation. During the period 1974-1985, the level of benefits under unemployment assistance 
on average amounts to 30 percent of unemployment insurance benefits (Björklund and 
Holmlund, 1989, p. 169). The recipients of unemployment assistance are not subject to a 
means-test in Sweden. 
The duration of unemployment assistance benefits is again differentiated 
according to age: unemployed workers under 55 are entitled to a maximum duration of 
tbirty weeks, workers between 55 and 60 are entitled to sixty weeks of assistance and 
workers over the age of 60 to ninety weeks. Unemployment assistance is financed out of 
general revenue. 
Swedish unemployment insurance and assistance are further supplemented by 
special arrangements for early retirement for labour market reasons, and severance 
payments for persons above 40 years of age (see Björklund and Holmlund, 1991, pp. 118-
121). A final remark concerns the famous Swedish active labour market policies. These 
policies, extensively described by Björklund and Holmlund (1991, pp. 135-137), include 
effïciently working employment offices, that give free services (such as the coverage of 
travelling costs) to the unemployed. The unemployed are also offered retraining courses 
and mobility grants, which cover the costs of moving to another place for a job. Besides, at 
the end of the benefit period, unemployment insurance recipients are entitled to a 
temporary job of about five or six months9. Note that this also means that, if no regular 
job is found in this period, the unemployed person qualifies for unemployment insurance 
benefits again. Finally, participation in training programmemes is counted as work and can 
also make a person eligible for unemployment benefits. 
4.2 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
The unemployment insurance system in the United Kingdom consists of regular unemploy-
ment insurance and unemployment assistance ('Income Support', before april 1988: 
'Supplementary Benefits'). This 'dual-tier structure' of British unemployment insurance was 
established in 1934, with the Unemployment Act. 
The main properties of current unemployment insurance in the United Kingdom 
are reviewed in Table 8. Besides the conditions mentioned in this table, the unemployed 
worker has to be capable of and available for work. and has to be involuntarily unem-
According to Björklund and Holmlund (1991, p. 136), the number of persons in such 
temporary job programmes varied cyclically between 0.5 and 1.5 percent of the labour 
force during the 1970s and 1980s. 
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ployed to be eligible for benefits. Since 1989, benefit claimants cannot refuse a job because 
the wage level is lower than in their previous job after 13 weeks of unemployment. 
Additionally, claimants should demonstrate that they are actively seeking work on a week-
by-week basis (see OECD, 1991, p. 212). An unemployed worker must wait three days 
before he or she becomes entitled to unemployment benefits. 
Unemployment benefits in the United Kingdom are flat-rate benefits, which 
contain a payment for the unemployed individual plus an increase for a dependent partner. 
The allowance in unemployment insurance for dependent children has been abolished in 
1984. Between 1966 and 1982, British unemployment insurance also knew an 'earnings 
related supplement' (ERS), based on a worker's average covered earnings during a base 
year. It was payable during the third and twenty-eighth week of an unemployment spell 
covered by basic unemployment benefit. Burtless (1987, p. 120) shows that the abolition of 
ERS had a substantial effect on the replacement ratio during the first year of unemploy-
ment. In principle, the level of unemployment benefits is linked to the price index in the 
United Kingdom. However, since 1986, this indexation depends on a decision by the 
Secretary of State. 
A final remark on unemployment benefit in the United Kingdom concerns 
ternporary unemployment: British employers have to pay allowances for the first fivedays 
of ternporary unemployment. 
Table 8 : Unemployment insurance in the United Kingdom 
Eligibility in the last tax year, contributions must 
have been paid on earnings of at least 50 
times the weekly 'lower earnings limit' 
(about 11 weeks of employment at aver-
age wage) 
Level of benefit flat-rate, taxable benefit 
Maximum duration 52 weeks 
Financing unemployment benefits are financed by 
employers' and employees' national insur-
ance contributions 
the weekly 'lower earnings limit' is the income level at which employees start to 
pay national insurance contributions 
Unemployment assistance in the United Kingdom is not a separate programme 
for assistance to the unemployed, but a part of social assistance ('Income Support'), which 
is supposed to act as a 'safety net'. This situation in the United Kingdom resembles the 
Dutch organisation of social assistance, in which unemployment assistance is also part of 
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public assistance and intended to act as 'assistance of last resort'. British unemployment 
assistance offers benefits to unemployed persons, whose family income falls short of a 
certain level. Hence, unemployment assistance is income-tested on the family level: 
spouse's earnings, income from capital (above a maximum), unemployment and child 
benefits are all part of the income-test. Moreover, people with capital in excess of a certain 
maximum (since 1988: £ 6000) are not entitled to income support. The unemployed on 
assistance are obliged to seek a job. Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are not automatically 
entitled to unemployment assistance, but instead they are offered a place on the 'Youth 
Training Scheme'. 
The level of benefits under unemployment assistance in the United Kingdom, 
depends on age, marital status and the presence of children. For special groups, like single 
parents, there are premia. Unemployment assistance is subject to taxation. The maximum 
duration of Income Support is uniimited. Unemployment assistance is financed out of 
general revenue. 
4.3 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN GERMANY 
In Germany, protection against the loss of income as a result of unemployment, includes 
three programmes: unemployment insurance ('Arbeitslosengeld')i unemployment assistance 
('Arbeitslosenhilfe') and public assistance ('Sozialhilfe') . 
In Table 9 we review four important characteristics of German unemployment 
insurance. In 1981, eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits were tightened; 
previously, an unemployed person was required to have made contributions for at least six 
months during the three-year period before registration as unemployed. Next to the 
eligibility condition, mentioned in Table 9, unemployed workers have to be involuntarily 
unemployed, must have registered at the employment office and must have applied for 
benefits, to be entitled to unemployment insurance in Germany. 
The statutory replacement rate of unemployment benefits is 63 percent of net 
eamings for employees without children since 1984. Before that year, unemployment 
benefits were 68 percent of previous net earnings. Previous net earnings are calculated as 
the average hourly wage for the last 20 days, net of social security contributions and 
income tax corresponding to the wage bracket and family circumstances. 
German unemployment insurance links the maximum duration of the benefit 
This section studies the German unemployment insurance system of 1989/1990. 
Hence, it is in fact concerned with unemployment insurance in West Germany, before the 
unification. 
21 
entitlement to the contribution record of the unemployed person. The ratio of one month's 
benefits for two month's insured unemployment was restored in 1987. Between 1983 and 
1987, the German goverament had tried to make savings by setting this ratio to one month 
of benefits for three months of contributions. Persons, who are at least 42 years old, are 
entitled to unemployment benefits for more than one year, when they have been in insured 
employment for more than 24 months during the seven previous years. Persons between 44 
and 49 years of age are entitled to 24 months of unemployment insurance, while people 
above 54 have a maximum duration of benefits of 32 months. 
Table 9 : Unemployment insurance in Germany 
Eligibility an unemployed employee is required to 
have made unemployment insurance 
contributions for at least twelve months 
during the three-year period before reg-
istration as unemployed 
Level of benefits unemployment benefit is 63% of previous 
net eamings, up to a maximum of 1.7 
times the average net eamings 
Maximum duration maximum duration of benefit entitlement 
is linked to the contribution period of the 
unemployed person: (since 1987) one 
month of entitlement for two months of 
insured employment; maximum duration 
for people under 42 is one year 
Financing employers and employees pay unemploy-
ment insurance contributions at the same 
rate, as a payroll tax 
To be eligible for unemployment assistance, the unemployed must have worked 
for five months in the year, preceding registration as unemployed. Note that, unlike the 
situation in the Netherlands, there is a contribution requirement for unemployment 
assistance in Germany. The receipt of unemployment assistance is subject to a means-test. 
The benefit under unemployment assistance is based on the previous net eamings of the 
unemployed worker. Unemployed workers receive 56 percent of their previous wage, net of 
social security contributions and income tax, up to maximum net eamings of 1.7 times 
average net eamings. Unemployment assistance is granted without any time limit. It is 
financed out of general revenue. 
As an unemployed person must have a work record, to be eligible for unemploy-
ment assistance m Germany, some of them (especially new entrants, see OECD, 1991, p. 
224) will depend on public assistance. German public assistance is means-tested and 
requires the willingness to work. The benefits are fiat-rate payments, up to 'levelsof need*. 
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Public assistance is administered by local authorities, according to national guidelines. 
5 SOME Q U A N T I T A T I V E I N F O R M A T I O N ON 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Until now, we mainly discussed the institutional aspects of unemployment insurance. The 
arrangements in four countries for people who lose their income as a result of unemploy-
ment were studied. In this section, we examine some empirical aspects of unemployment 
insurance. First, the 'coverage' of the unemployment insurance system is studied: which 
fraction of the population of unemployed is covered by unemployment insurance or 
assistance, and how have the relative shares of insurance and assistance varied over time? 
A second point of attention is the replacement ratio. Information about the replacement 
ratio is especially important, as this is a crucial variable when studying the disincentive 
effect of unemployment benefits on labour supply (see Vijlbrief, 1992). The replacement 
ratio will turn out to be a concept which is difficult to define and compute. Finally, we 
review the expenditures on unemployment insurance in these countries. 
5.2 COVERAGE 
It is common to measure the protection offered by unemployment insurance systems, not 
only by looking at the level of benefits, but also by taking the fraction of the unemployed 
covered by unemployment insurance into account. If the replacement ratio is 90 percent, 
but the coverage of unemployment insurance is only 10 percent, the system will not give 
more average protection against the fïnancial consequences of unemployment, than one 
that offers only 50 percent replacement of previous wages, but that covers 90 percent of 
the unemployed. Figure 1 shows the combination of replacement ratios and coverage for a 
number of countries of the European Community. This section focuses on the coverage of 
the unemployment insurance systems in the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and Germany. Besides, we look at the relative shares of unemployment insurance and 
assistance. 
The coverage of the unemployment insurance system in the Netherlands is shown 
in Figure 2. Total coverage is defmed as the number of unemployed receiving an unem-
ployment insurance or assistance benefit, divided by the total number of unemployed. 
Hence, the total coverage can be split in the coverage by unemployment insurance and the 
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Figure 1 : Protection by unemployment insurance systems in a number of countries, 1987 
Source : Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1989, p. 132. 
coverage by unemployment assistance. The proportion of the unemployed, either receiving 
an unemployment insurance or assistance benefit, has risen from approximately 70 percent 
in the seventies, to above 90 percent in 1988. 
However, the fraction of unemployed people, who are not eligible (anymore) for 
unemployment insurance, has risen during the eighties. This could be a result of the fact 
that the Dutch govemment shortened the maximum duration for unemployment provision 
benefits in the eighties. The main reason, however, is the lengthening of unemployment 
durations in the Netherlands. The average duration of an unemployment spell in the 
Netherlands increased from S.Omonths in 1980 to 9.9months in 1987 (see Van Ours, 1991, 
p. 375). More and more people exhausted their unemployment insurance entitlement and 
had to apply for assistance, which is reflected by the growing proportion of the unem-
ployed covered by assistance (see also OECD, 1988, p. 125). The already mentioned rise of 
total coverage in the Netherlands may be explained by the fact that more unemployed 
people qualified for unemployment assistance in the eighties. This may indicate that a 
larger proportion of the appliers for assistance actually met the requirements of the 
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Figure 2 : Coverage of unemployment insurance and assistance in the Netherlands, 1970-
1988 
Data sources : Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek and Centraal Planbureau, 1989. 
means-test, or that, as long-term unemployment has become widespread in the Nether-
lands during the eighties, the stigma of living on assistance has been partially removed. 
As Figure 3 shows, the coverage of unemployment insurance and assistance in 
Sweden rosé from 51 to 86 percent between 1973 and 198511. This growth in overall 
coverage is the result of an increase in the membership of the unemployment insurance 
funds and the introduction of unemployment assistance in 1974. The coverage by unem-
ployment insurance increased from 47 percent in 1973 to 68 percent in 1985. The take-up 
of unemployment assistance has also risen considerably in the same period. Björklund and 
Holmlund (1989, p. 169) observe that the share of unemployed workers without insurance 
or assistance falls with age in Sweden and that the short-term unemployed are more likely 
to lack benefits or assistance than those who have been unemployed for a longer time. 
11
 Björklund and Holmlund (1991, pp. 122-126) note the same rising trend in Swedish 
unemployment compensation coverage. However, their estimate of the coverage during the 
eighties is substantially smaller than the one mentioned in the text, which is calculated by 
Burtless, 1987, p. 134. For example, Björklund and Holmlund find a coverage of 70 percent 
in 1985, while Burtless calculates that 86 percent of the Swedish unemployed receive 
compensation. 
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Figure 3 : The overall coverage of unemployment insurance in Sweden, 1973-1985 
Data source : Burtless, 1987, p. 134. 
Figure 4 : Coverage of unemployment iasurance and assistance in the United Kingdom, 
1970-1984 
Data source : Burtless, 1987, p. 122. 
Since 1970, the share of the unemployed receiving unemployment compensation 
(insurance or assistance) has increased markedly in the United Kingdom. Figure 4 shows 
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that the fraction of the unemployed, receiving either unemployment insurance or unem-
ployment assistance benefits has risen from 56 percent in 1967 to 90 percent in 1984. As it 
is the case for the Netherlands, the increase in the cömbined coverage of unemployment 
insurance and unemployment assistance is caused by a sharp rise in the coverage of 
assistance. The tightening of eligibility conditions (in the eighties), the growing fraction in 
unemployment of new entrants on the labour market, and the longer durations of 
unemployment led to a falling proportion of persons on unemployment insurance in the 
United Kingdom. On the other hand, more and more unemployed have become entitled to 
unemployment assistance. 
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Figure 5 : Coverage of unemployment insurance and assistance in West Germany, 1970-
1985 
Data source : Burtless, 1987, p. 130. 
In Figure 5, the developments between 1970 and 1985 in the coverage of 
unemployment insurance and assistance in Germany are shown. Germany is the only of the 
four countries in which the coverage has actually fallen since the beginning of the 
seventies. Due to tightened eligibility conditions, the shortened maximum durations of 
German unemployment benefits, and the increase in the duration of unemployment, the 
coverage of unemployment insurance has been reduced. Ho we ver, unlike the situation in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there was no large increase in the coverage of 
unemployment assistance in Germany. This could be the result of not so many unemployed 
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people meeting the requirements of the means-test of unemployment assistance, but we 
should also keep in mind that eligibility conditions for unemployment assistance are more 
strict in Germany (a contribution record, see Section 4.3). Some of the unemployed 
(especially young adults), not entitled to any unemployment compensation, will be covered 
by German public assistance (which is not reflected in Figure 5). 
5.3 REPLACEMENT RATIOS 
The ratio between the unemployment benefit and earnings when employed, is known as 
the replacement ratio. There are several ways to define and calculate replacement ratios. 
In the first place, we distinguish the statutory replacement ratio of the unemployment 
insurance system, which indicates the relation between the unemployment benefit and the 
past wage (except when unemployment insurance pays flat-rate benefits, like the Swedish 
or British system). 
In the second place, one can also distinguish the actual ratio of unemployment 
benefits to wages. These actual replacement ratios can be calculated economy-wide 
(macroeconomic) or for a specific group of unemployed (microeconomic). In most cases, 
macroeconomic replacement ratios show the average unemployment benefit per recipiënt 
or unemployed person, relative to the average wage per employee. The macroeconomic 
replacement ratio can be used when studying and comparing the 'generosity' of unemploy-
ment insurance systems. Microeconomic replacement ratios are typically calculated for 
wage earners at different earnings levels, and for various durations of unemployment. In 
most cases, these replacement ratios are hypothetical, as information on actual benefit 
receipt of different groups is rare. Microeconomic replacement ratios are especially 
relevant when investigating the disincentive effect of unemployment benefits on labour 
supply. 
A further distinction which can be made, when comparing actual replacement 
ratios, is the difference between the gross and the net replacement ratio. One can compare 
the gross income, in and out of work, or adjust the wage and unemployment benefit for 
income taxes and social security contributions. The net replacement ratio gives more 
precise information about the disincentives for labour supply. In the remainder of this 
section, we review calculations of the replacement ratio for the countries under study. 
Figure 6 shows two time-series of macroeconomic replacement ratios for the 
Netherlands. The series of Chan-Lee et al. (1987, p. 128) is calculated as the "Standard 
national accounts unemployment compensation payments/number of unemployed divided 
by compensation in manufacturing/number of production workers in manufacturing". Our 
own measure of the macroeconomic replacement ratio is defined as the average unemploy-
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ment insurance benefit per benefit-year, divided by the average weekly earnings of a male 
manufacturing worker times 52. Both measures are gross replacement ratios. The 
difference between the two series can be explained by the fact that Chan-Lee et al. use all 
unemployment compensation payments, which also include the lower assistance benefits, 
and that they calculate the benefit per unemployed worker instead of per benefit-year (or 
recipiënt). 
Figure 6 : Macro-economie replacement ratios for the Netherlands, 1975-1987 
Data sources: Chan-Lee et al., 1987, p. 128, and Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgel-
egenheid, 1989 and CBS, 1987. 
According to both measures, the macroeconomic replacement ratio has declined 
during the eighties. The sharp fall of Chan-Lee's replacement ratio after 1980, shows the 
efforts of the Dutch government to make savings on the outlays for unemployment 
insurance, for example by shortening the maximum duration of unemployment provision 
benefits (see Section 3.2) and the suspension of the indexation of unemployment assistance 
benefits. The fall in our own measure of the macroeconomic replacement ratio in 1985 
reflects the reduction in the statutory replacement ratio of unemployment insurance from 
80 to 70 percent. 
Turning to microeconomic replacement ratios for the Netherlands, Chan-Lee et 
al. (1987, p. 127) give net hypothetical replacement ratios, for a married unemployed 
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Figure 7 : Net replacement ratios for the Netherlands, 1970-1988 
Data source : Ministry of Economie Affaire, unpublished. 
worker who earaed the average wage, with two children and a non-working spouse. After 
one month of unemployment (July 1982) and thirteen months of unemployment (July 
1983), the replacement ratios are 88 and 82 percent respectively. 
Figure 7 shows three series of the net replacement ratio, for an adult, married 
manufacturing worker with two children and a non-working spouse, who earaed the net 
average wage. The upper line gives the replacement ratio of unemployment insurance 
benefits, the middle line of unemployment assistance benefits. Until 1983, these series 
show an upward trend. However, in 1984 and 1985 a series of severe cuts in Dutch 
unemployment insurance took place, such as a 3 percent reduction in benefits in 1984, and 
the fall in the statutory unemployment insurance replacement ratio from 80 to 70 percent 
in 1985 (see also De Jong et al., (1990, pp. 33-34). The bottom line in Figure 7 gives a 
weighted average replacement ratio for the unemployed in the Netherlands: the unemploy-
ment insurance and assistance replacement ratio are weighted with the fraction of the 
unemployed receiving those benefits, while we also take into account that a proportion of 
the Dutch unemployed is not covered. This weighted average replacement ratio gives an 
indication of the 'average' disincentive effect of unemployment benefits in the Netherlands. 
The increase in this replacement ratio between 1979 and 1983 is caused by the rise in the 
unemployment insurance replacement ratio and the sharp increase in the coverage of 
unemployment assistance in those years. Note that the reduction in the unemployment 
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insurance and assistance replacement ratio between 1983 and 1986 did not lead to a fall in 
the average replacement ratio, since the coverage of unemployment assistance increased 
strongly in those years. 
Information on the replacement of wages by unemployment benefits in the 
Netherlands in 1987 (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1989, pp. 128-
131), shows that the net replacement ratio for a worker who earaed the average wage is 
between 77 and 80 percent in the first year of unemployment. After two years of unem-
ployment, the (unemployment assistance) replacement ratio depends on family situation: 
for a married worker without children it is still around 75 percent, but for a single worker 
without children if falls to 55 percent. 
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Figure 8 : Replacement ratios for Sweden, 1970-1985 
Data sources : Chan-Lee et al, 1987, p. 128 and Burtless, 1987, p. 134. 
Figure 9 shows two time-series of the replacement ratio in Sweden. The 
replacement ratio of Chan-Lee et al. is calculated like the one for the Netherlands. The 
time-series of Björklund and Holmlund shows 'average replacement rates among insured, 
male blue-collar workers who experience an unemployment spell of exactly three months* 
(Burtless, 1987, p. 158, see also Björklund and Holmlund, 1991, pp. 132-133). Both replace-
ment ratios show an upward trend, especially after 1971. Remember that the time-series of 
Chan-Lee et al., due to its definition, not only reflects the rise in unemployment benefit 
levels relative to wages, but also the increase in the length of the maximum benefit 
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periods, the rise in the overall coverage of unemployment insurance in Sweden and the 
introduction of unemployment assistance. 
Information on net, microeconomic replacement ratios in Sweden in 1980 (see 
Burtless, 1987, p. 132) shows that the flat-rate unemployment insurance system results in a 
sharp fall of the replacement ratio, when earnings levels rise: for a married worker with 
two children who earned two-thirds of the average wage, the replacement ratio was 92 
percent, at the average wage 69 percent and at twice the average wage 45 percent (see also 
Björklund and Holmlund (1991, p. 134), who corroborate these results for 1985). More-
over, there is a large difference between the replacement ratio in the first and the second 
year of unemployment in Sweden: for the same groups mentioned above, unemployment 
assistance offers a replacement of respectively 50, 37 and 24 percent of previous wages in 
the second year of unemployment. Calculations for a male, blue-collar worker with average 
earnings in 1985 give a replacement ratio of unemployment insurance of 75-80 percent, 
while it is 50-60 percent for white-collar workers in Sweden (Björklund and Holmlund, 
1991, p. 133). Finally, the OECD (1991, p. 234) calculates gross replacement ratio's for a 
single male at average earnings for Sweden in 1989 of 85 percent for the short-term 
(unemployment insurance) and 39 percent for the long-term (unemployment assistance). 
Figure 9 shows two time-series of the macroeconomic replacement ratio in the 
United Kingdom. The replacement ratio of Chan-Lee et al. is again computed in the same 
way as for Sweden and the Netherlands. Smee's replacement ratio is defined as the 
average compensation per unemployed person divided by a weighted average of the 
estimated net earnings of the various age, sex, and family groups in the unemployment 
register (see Burtless, 1987, p. 155-156), and is obviously higher wan that of Ghan-Lee et 
al.. According to both measures, the replacement ratio has declined in the United 
Kingdom since 1970. 
Calculations of net microeconomic replacement ratios for hypothetical earnings 
levels and family situations show the effect of the flat-rate unemployment benefit system in 
the United Kingdom: as in Sweden, the replacement ratio falls with the level of previous 
earnings (see Burtless, 1989, p. 116). Dilnot and Morris (1983) calculated actual replace-
ment ratios for a sample of employed men for selected years between 1968 and 1983. They 
find that, holding the population of employed constant at its 1980 distribution, replacement 
ratios have fallen from 87 percent in 1968 to 60 percent in 1983. For the United Kingdom, 
calculations of the replacement ratio in July 1987 are available (Ministerie van Sociale 
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1989, p. 128-132). The net replacement ratio (including 
allowances) for a married worker with two children at an average wage is 63 percent in 
1987. For a single worker, the net replacement ratio (including allowances) is 40 percent. 
The OECD (1991, p. 234) finds a comparable replacement ratio of 41 percent for single 
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males at the average wage in 1989. Characteristic for the British system is the absence of a 
difference between the short- and the long-term replacement ratio. 
Figure 9 : Macro-economie replacement ratios for the United Kingdom, 1970-1984 
Data sources : Chan-Lee et al., 1987,p. 128 and Burtless, 1987,p. 122. 
Figure 10 shows macroeconomic replacement ratios for Germany, calculated by 
Chan-Lee et al. (1987, p. 128) and Bruche and Reissert (see Burtless, 1987, p. 130). The 
measure of the replacement ratio of Chan-Lee et al., calculated in the same marmer as 
those of the other countries, shows a very erratic development which is hard to interpret. 
The replacement ratio, as calculated by Bruche and Reissert (defïned as the average 
monthly unemployment benefit divided by the average net wage per employee) is slightly 
falling from the beginning of the eighties, which can be explained by the tightening of 
eligibility conditions and the reduction of the statutory benefit level. 
The net, microeconomic replacement ratio in Germany, for a hypothetical 
married unernployed worker at average wage, with two children and non-working spouse 
was about seventy percent in 1982/1983 (see Chan-Lee et al., 1987, p. 127). In 1987, this 
replacement ratio was 87 percent for the above described unernployed worker, while it was 
63 percent for a single unernployed worker at average wage at the beginning of unem-
ployment, falling to 59 percent after one year of unemployment (Ministerie van Sociale 
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1989,pp. 128-131). 
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Figure 10 : Macro-economie replacement ratios for West Germany, 1970-1984 
Data sources : Chan-Lee et al., 1987, p. 128 and Burtless, 1987, p. 130. 
Summarizing this survey of replacement ratios in the four countries under study, 
we start with the United Kingdom. In this country, the replacement ratio shows a 
downward trend since the seventies. In the Netherlands, this development started at the 
beginning of the eighties. In both countries, the lengthening of unemployment durations 
and the accompanying fall in the average benefit level are important backgrounds to this 
development. Besides, in the eighties, the Dutch and British govemments tried to make 
savings on unemployment benefits. In Germany, macro-economie replacement ratios also 
show a fall, but other empirical information, especially for the most recent period, does 
not point in the direction of a significant reduction in German replacement ratios (see 
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken Werkgelegenheid, 1989, p. 129). Only in Sweden, the 
unemployment insurance system has clearly become more generous in the past decades 
(see also Björklund and Holmlund, 1991, p. 134). 
A comparison of the macroeconomic replacement ratios by Chan-Lee et al. for 
the four countries, shows that Sweden gives the highest 'average compensation' for 
unemployment, foliowed by the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom. In 1987, 
the microeconomic unemployment insurance replacement ratio for a married, male worker 
with two children at the average wage is highest in Germany, closely foliowed by the 
Netherlands, while British replacement ratios are clearly lower. The Swedish short-term 
replacement ratio is of the same order of magnitude as in the Netherlands. For single 
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males, the replacement ratio is considerably lower in Gennany and the United Kingdom, 
which makes Dutch and Swedish benefit levels the most generous for this group. Finally, 
looking at long-term (unemployment assistance) replacement ratios, the largest change 
takes place in Sweden, where long-term benefit levels are much smaller than those for the 
short-term. For the long-term unemployed, German and Dutch replacement ratios are 
highest. 
5.4 UNEMPLOYMENTINSURANCE EXPENDITURES 
Before the expenditures on unemployment insurance systems are studied in more detail, 
we fïrst take a quick look at the outiays on total social security in the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and Germany12. Table 10 presents these outiays as a percentage of 
gross domestic product. The high expenditures on social security in the Netherlands are 
primarily caused by high outiays on sickness, disability and unemployment benefits as 
compared to the United Kingdom and Germany (see Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid, 1991, pp. 101-104). However, in the Netherlands, taxes and social 
security contributions on benefits are higher than in the United Kingdom and Germany. 
This implies that the difference in net expenditures on social security between the 
Netherlands and the other countries is smaller than indicated by Table 10. The three 
countries show substantial differences in the financing of social security. In the Nether-
lands, the government pays only 17 percent of social security expenditures, while this is 26 
percent in Gennany and 41 percent in the United Kingdom in 1989. 
Table 10 : Gross social security outiays of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
Gennany, as a percentage of gross domestic product* 
1970 1975 1980 1983 1985 1989 
Netherlands 19.6 26.7 30.4 33.8 31.1 30.2 
United Kingdom 14.3 19.7 21.5 23.9 24.4 20.6 
Germany 21.5 29.7 28.7 28.8 28.2 27.3 
Including supplementary old age pensions and administration costs. 
Source: Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1990, p. 159 and 1991,p. 175. 
We do not have recent information on the costs of social security in Sweden. 
However, accordtng to Emerson (1988, p. 54), social expenditures were 33.4 percent of 
GDP in Sweden in 1981. 
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Figure 11 : Expenditures on Dutch unemployment insurance (in millions of guilders), 
1975-1988 
Data source : Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1989, pp. 152-158. 
mstf-ence EC<<N un. provlolon Y///A aee l e tenee 
Figure 13 : Number of recipients of unemployment compensation in the Netherlands, 
1975-1988 
Data source : Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1989, pp. 148-152. 
Figure 11 illustrates the development in the expenditures on unemployment 
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insurance, unemployment provision and unemployment assistance benefits, between 1975 
and 1988 in the Netherlands. The outlays on unemployment insurance have increased 
sharply, especially between 1980 and 1984. This is entirely caused by the rise in the volume 
of benefit recipients in this period (see Figure 12): both the outlays and the volume of 
total unemployment insurance have risen with about 180 percent between 1980 and 1984. 
After 1984, expenditures on unemployment insurance per recipiënt, which had been stable 
since 1980, started to fall as a result of the efforts of the Dutch government to make 
savings on social security, and as a result of more and more people loosing their unem-
ployment benefit entitlement and having to live on unemployment assistance. 
In 1989, the outlays for total unemployment insurance (including unemployment 
assistance) amounted to 2.8 percent of gross domestic product in the Netherlands, 
compared to 1.3 percent in the United Kingdom and 1.7 percent in Germany (Ministerie 
van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 1991, p. 99)13. However, note that the difference 
in net outlays on unemployment insurance between the Netherlands and the other 
countries will again be smaller than indicated above. The difference in outlays between the 
Netherlands on the one hand and the United Kingdom and Germany on the other can be 
partly explained by the unemployment record of the countries: in 1988, unemployment in 
the Netherlands was 9.2 percent of the labour force, in the United Kingdom 6.9 percent 
and in Germany 6.2 percent (OECD, 1991, p. 213). The outlays for unemployment insura-
nce in the United Kingdom are particularly small, because of the low average benefit level 
in that country. 
This paper starts with studying unemployment insurance as a part of the social security 
system. We stress the difference between social insurance -more or less based on the 
equivalence principle- on the one hand, and social assistance -based on the solidarity 
principle- on the other. In the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany, 
unemployment compensation is a mixture of unemployment insurance and assistance. 
In these four countries, unemployment insurance covers the financial risk of 
unemployment, for those persons who have paid enough contributions to be eligible. The 
duration of payments under unemployment insurance is limited. The benefit systems of the 
Netherlands and Germany are most clearly based on the equivalence principle, since the 
The OECD (1991, pp. 238-249) estimates Dutch unemployment compensation 
outlays in 1990 at 2.3 percent of GDP and for Sweden at 0.7 percent. 
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level of the unemployment benefit is related to the previous wage rate (up to a certain 
maximum). Moreover, in both countries, the period of benefit entitlement depends on the 
length of the period in which unemployment insurance contributions were paid. 
Table 11 : Summary of unemployment insurance/assistance in the Netherlands, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and Germany 
Netherlands Sweden United King-
dom 
Germany 
Statutory 
replacement 
ratio* 
70% / -
— — 
63% / 56% 
Duration 
(weeks) 
26-260(4-52)/ 
indefinite 
6 0 / 30 5 2 / indefinite 52 / indefinite 
Coverage 
(1984) 
0.41/ 0.43 0.87 0.32/ 0.58 0.41 / 0.29 
Replacement 
ratio (1987)** 
75-80 % 85% / 39% 63 % 87 % 
Outlays (per-
centage of 
GDP, 1989) 
2.8% 0.7 % 1.3% 1.7% 
Figures before the slash refer to unemployment insurance, after the slash to 
unemployment assistance. 
Microeconomic replacement ratio, calculated for a married worker at average 
wage with two children in 1987 (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegen-
heid, 1989, pp. 128-131). For Sweden, OECD (1991, p. 234) figures, for a single 
male in 1989. 
This figure refers to 1990 (see OECD, 1991, pp. 238-249) 
Unemployed persons, who exhaust their benefit entitlement or who do not have 
a sufficiënt contribution record to be eligible for unemployment benefits, may be entitled 
to unemployment assistance. With the exception of Germany, unemployment assistance 
pays flat-rate benefits. These benefits are meant for unemployed people who are not able 
to provide for their own means of living and are usually means-tested (except in Sweden). 
In the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany, unemployment assistance pays 
benefits for an indefinite period. 
In the section on empirical aspects of the unemployment insurance systems in 
the four countries, we argue that the 'gcnerosity' of an unemployment insurance system 
not only depends on the level of benefits, but also on the coverage of unemployment 
insurance. Table 11 gives a summary of the main results of the empirical section. In 
Germany, the coverage of the unemployment insurance system is lower than in the other 
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countries, which may be caused by the contribution requirement of German unemployment 
assistance. A comparison of microeconomic replacement ratios for married workers at 
average wage with two children shows that unemployment benefits are relatively highest in 
Germany, foliowed by Sweden, the Netherlands and, at a distance, the United Kingdom. 
For single persons, Swedish and Dutch replacement ratios are highest. Note that the fall in 
the replacement ratio after the first year of unemployment is very large in Sweden. 
Summarizing the differences in the generosity of the unemployment insurance 
systems in the four countries under study, the United Kingdom has the least generous 
system. Germany has slightly higher unemployment benefits than the Netherlands for 
married workers, but the replacement ratio is lower for singles and German unemploy-
ment insurance covers less unemployed than in the Netherlands. In Sweden, the coverage 
of the unemployment insurance system is high and short-term benefits are probably as 
generous as they are in the Netherlands. However, long-term Swedish benefits are lower 
than in the Netherlands, and the Swedish benefit system is supported by effective active 
labour market policies, which prevent people from drawing benefits for a long time. 
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ABSTRACT 
Most developed countries have a system, which protects workers against the financial risk 
of unemployment. This paper describes the unemployment insurance systems in four 
countries: the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany. In these countries, 
unemployment compensation consists of two parts: unemployment insurance, with a 
contribution requirement and a limited duration of benefit payments; unemployment 
assistance, compensating people, who are unable to provide for their own means of living, 
for an indefinite time period. 
In the Netherlands, the coverage of the unemployed by unemployment assistance 
has increased markedly since the beginning of the eighties. Although the replacement 
ratios of Dutch unemployment insurance and assistance showed a steady increase from 
1970 until 1983, this trend was reversed by the cuts in benefits between 1983 and 1986. 
Despite these reductions in benefit levels, the 'weighted average replacement ratio', that 
takes the increasing coverage of the unemployed into account, did not fall after 1983. 
The generosity of the unemployment insurance systems, measured by the level of 
benefits and the coverage of the system, is much lower in the United Kingdom than in the 
other countries. Comparing the Dutch and the Swedish system is especially interesting, 
since the latter is often considered to be an example for the Netherlands. Most striking 
differences between the two countries are the large drop in the benefit level in Sweden 
after one year of unemployment, and the extensive use of active labour market policies to 
prevent long-term unemployment in this country. 
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